Abstract
The centrepiece of this paper is Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee with empirical details of its politics of institutional choice and outcomes. The Committee is hailed as a model of ‘bottom-up’ reform and one of the principal reasons why Ghana is likely to circumvent a ‘resource curse’ situation associated with its petroleum resources. Far from this optimism, this article outlines key technocratic, political and other structural barriers that have undermined the Committee’s profile as a transformative instrument in the oil industry. It draws attention to the limitations of technocratic administrative fixes imposed by in-country and sectoral dynamics.
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