Abstract
In Simulation and Similarity, Michael Weisberg offers a similarity-based account of the model–world relation, which is the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Weisberg’s main idea is that models are similar to targets in virtue of sharing features. An important concern about Weisberg’s account is that it remains silent on what it means for models and targets to share features, and consequently on how feature-sharing contributes to models’ epistemic success. I consider three potential ways of concretizing the concept of shared features: as identical, quantitatively sufficiently close, and sufficiently similar features. I argue that each of these concretizations faces significant challenges, leaving unclear how Weisberg’s account substantially contributes to elucidating the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Against this background, I outline a pluralistic revision and argue that this revision may not only help Weisberg's account evade several of the problems that I raise, but also offers a novel perspective on the model–world relation more generally. 1Introduction2Weisberg’s Feature-Sharing Account3What Is a Shared Feature? 3.1Identity3.2Sufficient closeness3.3Sufficient similarity4Turning Weisberg’s Account ‘Upside Down’5Conclusion
Highlights
2 Weisberg’s Feature-Sharing Account 3 What Is a Shared Feature?3.1 Identity 3.2 Sufficient closeness 3.3 Sufficient similarity 4 Turning Weisberg’s Account ‘Upside Down’
Various authors in the philosophy of science literature have offered accounts of the model–world relation, which is the relation in virtue of which scientific models exhibit their predictive and explanatory capabilities
In contrast to isomorphism-based accounts (Bueno et al [2002]; da Costa and French [2003]), they purportedly capture several important intuitions: that the model–world relation is instantiated in degrees (Weisberg [2013], p. 154); that only relevant instances of the relation matter for successful representation (Weisberg [2013], p. 135); and that contextual factors such as modellers’ epistemic aims play important roles in scientific representation (Giere [2004], [2010]; van Fraassen [2008]; Maki [2009])
Summary
Various authors in the philosophy of science literature have offered accounts of the model–world relation, which is the relation in virtue of which scientific models exhibit their predictive and explanatory capabilities. I propose pluralistic revisions to Weisberg’s account This revised account offers a menu of different ways models can share features with their targets: by means of quantitative closeness, identity, isomorphism, similarity, and possibly other relations too. This revision does help Weisberg’s account with some of the challenges that I raise, and offers a novel perspective on the model–world relation more generally. It departs from the monistic character of extant similarity- and isomorphism-based accounts that have specified one single type of relation to govern the manifold ways successful models can relate to their targets. Let me begin with a sketch of Weisberg’s account before I proceed to my critical and constructive contributions
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