Getting Less Cynical about Virtue

Abstract

This is a commentary on a paper by the social psychologist C. Daniel Batson. I too think virtue is rare, but not so rare as Batson seems to think, despite his ingenious experiments on “moral hypocrisy.” As usual, Dan Batson provides an experimentally rigorous, yet philosophically sophisticated, account of moral motivation—a model for exemplary work in moral psychology. I’ll attempt to summarize some of the main ideas in his illuminating essay but focus on raising some worries, despite much agreement otherwise. I too am cynical about character: virtue, like moral knowledge, is precarious. However, I will try to motivate the idea that we are more virtuous and morally motivated than Batson suggests. Batson gets cynical about character in two different ways and for two different reasons. First, character, as a psychological posit, isn’t useful. This is perhaps an unsurprising conclusion from a psychologist who many view as a father of situationism. But Batson’s reason for skepticism about character traits has little to do with the surprising role situational factors play in behavior. After all, we’re rather consistently egoistic across a wide range of situations, as some of Batson’s studies suggest (see also the discussion in Kleingeld 2015). Rather, we needn’t appeal to character to explain moral and immoral behavior, Batson says, because we achieve a deeper understanding of behavior by looking to motives and values (which, by the way, can vary easily with the situation). In particular, we should identify ultimate (or intrinsic) goals, which are pursued for their own sake, not as a means to something else. Second, Batson is cynical about character in the sense that good character is rare. By good character— at least good moral character—he seems to mean moral integrity: motivation to uphold moral principles for their own sake. We’re often ultimately driven by self-interest (egoism) instead of a concern to be moral. Now this conclusion is perhaps surprising from such an ardent defender of the existence of altruism (Batson 2011). However, while we can be ultimately motivated by moral principles and by a concern for others, Batson believes egoism is more common. The latest theme in his research suggests that, even when it comes to moral behavior, we are often ultimately motivated to appear moral while avoiding the cost of being moral if possible (the motive of moral hypocrisy). In other words, Batson believes that good character is rare