Gettiered Belief

Abstract

Gettiered beliefs are beliefs that fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by Gettier cases: cases like those Edmund Gettier employed to show that justified true belief doesn’t suffice for knowledge. What has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? I focus initially on two leading substantive answers, what I call the Ease of Mistake Approach and the Lack of Credit Approach. After critically assessing and rejecting each of these approaches, I introduce and evaluate two less prominent approaches to gettiered belief. According to the view I settle on—a species of what I call the Risk of Misleading Justification Approach—a gettiered belief is one which is justified and true, yet held in such a way that the belief’s subject either actually is justified in believing many falsehoods similar to its propositional content or could well have been so justified.