Gestational Surrogate’s Autonomy

Abstract

The necessary consent of the surrogate mother is a safeguard of both her autonomy and her self-dispositionand guarantees not only the protection of human value (article 2, paragraph 1 of the GreekConstitution) but also the protection of her personality (article 5 paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitutionand article 57 the Greek Civil Code). It is worth noting, after all, that sometimes it is necessary to restrictthe freedom of some people, in order to ensure the freedom of others. The gestational surrogate expectantis not forced for her act. Autonomy presupposes the possibility of formulating and implementinga decision, as a form of personal freedom, having as a result that pressure opposes the obstructionof the surrogate mother and the future parents to do what they want and therefore feel free and notbe oppressed indirectly. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin reports on the importance of autonomy inreproduction. According to the liberal view of human value, a behavior is not characterized as inhumanand degrading, nor immoral, in case it is not perceived as such by the subject who participates in it oraccepts it. Otherwise, an objective approach to this principle would be in case that a behavior is consideredto be inhuman by social criteria and regardless of the expression of the individual’s free consentand her possible desire to continue in activities offensive to the individual.