Gestalt theory, insight, and past experience: Reply to Dominowski.

Abstract

The present article addresses four important issues raised by Dominowski in his comments on our earlier article. First, we present evidence that our characterization of Gestalt theory is the view accepted by present-day psychologists and is also the view espoused by the Gestalt psychologists themselves. Second, we consider Dominowski's argument that the facilitation brought about by hints in our experiments as, in reality, support for Gestalt theory. Closer examination of the claims of Gestalt theory does not support Dominowski's interpretation of the data from our earlier article. Third, we examine in more detail our alternative interpretation of the data from our experiments. Fourth, we examine the roles proposed by Dominowski for the terms fixation and insight in psychological theory. In his comments on our earlier article (Weisberg & Alba, 1981), Dominowski (1981) raises a number of points, which, if correct, would seriously dilute the importance of our findings. In the present paper, we consider four issues raised by Dominowski. First, Dominowski argues that our earlier paper presents a mistaken characterization of Gestalt theory. Second, he questions whether the data concerning facilitation through hints in reality support Gestalt theory, contrary to our conclusions. Third, Dominowski argues that our explanation of our results is not very helpful. Fourth, he argues that we were being rash in suggesting that the terms insight and fixation be dropped from explanations of problem solving. Gestalt Theory Dominowski argues that our characterization of the Gestalt theory of problem solving is not accurate, and presents several quotes to support his claim. Two points should be made in response. First, and perhaps most important, the view we examine in our first paper concerning sudden and direct solutions to problems is the interpretation of Gestalt theory accepted by most present-day psychologists, which we briefly allude to in that