German Unification (1989–90)

Abstract

While preparations were proceeding for the Intergovernmental Conference, dramatic events unfolded in East-West relations which would alter completely the European picture that had evolved in the wake of the Second World War. German unification, until now at most a far-off prospect, suddenly loomed large as a real possibility, and then as an event likely to take place within months rather than years. Neither the Germans nor their west European allies were prepared for this turn of events. Chancellor Kohl, feeling he was presented with an opportunity that might fade away as suddenly as it had occurred, unerringly pursued his objective to force the issue, supported by the United States. The European allies, for whom the memory of a large Germany was so much more painful than for most Americans, were thrown into confusion, unable to welcome the prospect, but also unwilling to deny Germans the right of self-determination. President Mitterrand, after some erratic gestures indicating his confusion, concluded that events were beyond his control but that he could try to ensure that they would be linked to the process of unification being prepared in the European Community. Chancellor Kohl, who could not have failed to observe how his European partners were shocked by the prospect of early German unification, concurred, emphasising at every opportunity that German and European unification were two sides of the same coin.