German Security and Defence Policy in the Early 2020s and the Influence of US Interests

Abstract

The nature and content of the U.S. - German dialogue have been significant for shaping the distribution of influence and responsibility in Euro-Atlantic community. This article examines the extent to which the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) security and defense policy in the early 2020s aligns with U.S. interests. Under J. Biden`s administration the USA effectively rejected the FRG`s initiative to create a format for intergovernmental consultations. This initiative could have served as institutional “insurance” against the degradation of interstate dialogue experienced during D. Trump's administration. The signing of an agreement with the Taliban (recognized as a terrorist organization and banned in the Russian Federation) by D. Trump, and its implementation under J. Biden, forced Germany to end its strategic presence in Afghanistan. In an attempt to compensate for these losses, Germany has sought strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and significantly increased its military activity under NATO in Europe to “contain” Russia. The article explores the role of Germany in the distributing responsibility between Western democracies in their concurrent confrontations with Russia and China. Among the large NATO member states in Europe, including the U.K., Germany has held special military-practical importance for the USA. The White House was interested in the Bundeswehr as the framework nation in different forms in NATO Forward Presence Force, NATO Response Force, and New NATO Force Model. Germany in agreement with the USA, has supported the use of the EU and palliative structures (first of all, the Rammstein format) for the «discharge» of NATO on the most provocative for Russia tracks of the military assistance to Kiev.