Abstract
Participation today is perceived as a key component of democracy. A democratic political system must offer its citizens opportunities to take part in the law-making process and governance. Consequently, in a society that is governed by the rule of law, examples of participation can be found in the fields of constitutional and public law. But company law also offers fairly comparable participatory opportunities when it comes to the representation of shareholder interests towards a company's management, here as the expression of ownership. This paper conducts a structural examination of two mass-participatory settings with limited time frames governed by German law: federal elections and stockholders meetings. It thereby gives the notion of participation rooted in the political and social sciences a legal turn. By comparing how the law not only enables but guides participation, common regulatory design principles are developed. It proves the assumption that - despite their different logics and constraints - mass-participatory settings governed by German law inherently follow similar regulatory structures and ideas. We hope not only to trigger further comparisons but also to contribute to the practical regulatory design of future participatory settings in the private as well as the public sector.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.