German Air Strength 1933 to 1939: a Note

Abstract

'For the first time in ceinturies our country is (and must conltiinuc to be) at the mercy of a foreign power,' wrote Sir Warren Fisher to Neville Chamberlain in April 1 q38. The power in questioin was Germany: the cause of'Britain's defeencelessiness was the rapid growth of German air power. Fisher blamed the Air Staff f'or this calamity. 'For some years', he cointiinued, 'we have had from the Air Miinistry soothiing-syrup aind inicompeteince in equal measure.' He coincluded his letter to the Prime Minister with estimates of' German air strength and productive capability that vastly overrated the true state of' Germain preparations and exaggerated the disparity between the German and British air forces.' As it turned out there were more accurate assessmeints of' German air power available. It is Iiow kInowin that by 1937 both Air Intelligeince and the Foreign Office between them had arrived at figures for curreint and projected Germain strength and production that were reasonably close to the true figures. By the outbreak of' war there was a tendeincy to significaintly overestimate German potential.2 Evein these revelations, however, have not subdued the suspicioIn that for most of' the I930S the story of air rearmament in Britaiin was one of 'too little, too late'. It is generally agreed that before 1937 the RAF badly underestimated German air preparations and that Britain, if'not 'at the mercy of'a foreign power', was runniing a perilous course, invitiing Germany to use her new bomber force as a diplomatic trump. The Air Staff's argument, that Germany could not possibly conlstruct an effective air force in less than four or five years, has largely been ignored, though it proved to be accurate enough in the event.:3 Of' course, for the non-airmain, reports percolating from Germany were very alarmiing. Group-Captain Christie estimated in 1934 that 6o per ceint of'the output of' the new German aircraft industry was devoted to bomber output and that Germany was already producing aircraft at the rate of 5,ooo a year (when the actual figure was I,900).4 Churchill, oIn the basis of'a number of'sources, calculated in 1935 that Germany would have over 2,000 first-liine aircraft by October 1936, aind 3,000 a.year later, built around a large force of'modern bombers.-, Indeed during the period