Georgia and the Second Karabakh War

Abstract

The author traces how the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War tested Georgia internally, accentuated the country’s unfavorable position and propelled the military and political establishment to adjust to the changing dynamics in the South Caucasus. Internally the Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic minorities living in Georgia showed a high level of political responsibility, but some nevertheless were engaged in various activities to provide direct support for the warring sides, thus putting pressure on Tbilisi’s official stance in the conflict. Georgia also embarked upon active diplomacy, stressing its potential to play a positive role in alleviating the mutual distrust between Baku and Yerevan and limiting geopolitical threats to regional security. The timing for diplomatic maneuvering was interesting as Western powers were notoriously absent from diplomatic activity around the conflict. Georgia also witnessed vulnerabilities regarding the pipeline, railway and road infrastructure running from Azerbaijan to Turkey. The fighting could easily spread to the Tovuz region, as was the case in July 2020, or long-distance bombing would easily put the infrastructure out of order. The author explores how the emerging Nakhchivan corridor brought about multiple discussions on Georgia’s transit role. Though not directly threatening the country’s regional hub position, the development, nevertheless, showed the need for further development of the road and railway infrastructure. Tied into the worsening geopolitical landscape around Georgia is a further encirclement of Georgian borders by Russian troops, which limits potential NATO/US military projection into the region.