Abstract

In the aftermath of the Six-Day War (5–10 June 1967), Britain’s foreign secretary, George Brown, invested significant efforts in improving Britain’s relations with Egypt as part of his strategy to restore Britain’s standing in the Arab world and protect British economic and geostrategic interests in the Middle East. The unavoidable result of this policy was the worsening of relations between Britain and Israel, which blamed the British Foreign Office of adopting a deliberate pro-Arab and anti-Israel policy. The growing tension between the two countries developed into a personal confrontation between the Israeli prime minister and the British foreign secretary, who was regarded in Israel as the chief architect of the change of British policy in the region.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.