Genetic Selective Abortion: Still a Matter of Choice

Bruce P. Blackshaw

doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10080-5

Abstract

Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to abort based on fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised, and conclude that a liberal pro-choice stance on selective abortion for disability entails the permissibility of selective abortion for most genetic traits.

Highlights

Selective abortion can be controversial depending on its target, even amongst those who generally hold a liberal pro-choice stance towards abortion—a view predicated on the importance of individual rights and liberty, the right of women to control their own
I conclude that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to fetal abnormality abortions (FAA), as with sex selective abortion (SSA) we are unable to justify the prohibition of selecting against these traits—what we might call genetic selective abortion (GSA)
I have explicated Jeremy Williams’ argument which demonstrates that a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to FAA entails being unable to justify a prohibition for SSA, and shown that the same reasoning is applicable to GSA in general

Summary

Introduction

Selective abortion can be controversial depending on its target, even amongst those who generally hold a liberal pro-choice stance towards abortion—a view predicated on the importance of individual rights and liberty, the right of women to control their own. If it can be shown that this is the case, it is clearly far easier to justify the primacy of the woman’s right to control her body—her interests will always override those of the fetus These arguments form the primary justification for the liberal pro-choice position, but other moral theories are drawn upon that are not strictly liberal—the most common being consequentialist arguments such as claims that restricting abortion will force women to use illegal abortions that are far more dangerous for women (Grimes et al 2006), or will result in higher levels of child abuse (Bitler & Zavodny 2002). Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a pro-choice stance with regard to FAA, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of SSA (Williams 2012) I conclude that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to FAA, as with SSA we are unable to justify the prohibition of selecting against these traits—what we might call genetic selective abortion (GSA). Advances in diagnostic technology have vastly expanded (and will continue to expand) the information upon which our choices can be made

Women’s Interests

Genetic Selective Abortion

Objections

Autonomy Objection

Expressivist Objection

Genocide Objection

Consequentialist Objections

Commodification Objection

Moral Differences

Findings

Conclusion