Genetic Phenomenology and the Husserlian Account of Ethics

Abstract

In this essay I will argue that Husserl's methodological transition to genetic phenomenology is an important development with ramifications for his ethical theory. We shall see how the transition to genetic phenomenology paves the way for thinking about plurality in community without the elimination of ethical foundations, or the elimination of the importance of inherited convictions. In order to achieve this understanding we shall first examine Husserl's ethics paying close attention to the differences between his early ethical theories and his later ethical theories. I will show how the early ethical theories are clearly informed by the static phenomenological method and how the later ethical theories are made possible by the supplementation of static phenomenology with the genetic phenomenological method. This allows for the claim that the genetic method makes possible a much more rich and nuanced way of understanding the ethical individual and his or her relationship to a historical as well as concurrent community. Ethics Husserl's early ethics, primarily explicated in lectures from 1908 through 1914, are characterized by his concern with a scientific grounding for ethics, and include an exploration into the question of a categorical imperative. Like his preoccupations in the broader spectrum of his thought, his ethical investigations too are concerned with overcoming relativism and skepticism. He first attempts to establish a phenomenological axiology founded upon an analogy with the early structure of reason he provided in other works. The structure that he describes as formal logic is applied then to a formal axiology.1 Like formal logic, a formal axiology would provide a universal structure for ethical judgments. It would establish principles that are abstracted from the content of ethical judgments and legislate for consistency in ethical practice and ethical judgments. Just as thought requires a distinction between reason and acts, which the laws of logic can provide, valuing requires a distinction between reason and acts, which only laws of axiology and formal laws of practical action can provide. The analogy with formal logic functions on different levels. Like logic, there are the formal laws to which value judgments must conform in order for us to claim consistency in our beliefs or actions. These formal laws make clear that if something ought to be done, then if one desires the good, but fails to do that thing, one is irrational. In logic one does not evaluate an argument on form alone. We must also consider whether the premises, in other words, the content, are true claims. Likewise, in ethics, the goodness of an action cannot be determined on form alone. The formal axiology must take into account the truth or falsity of those consistent claims. This requires reference to the material content of an ethical claim. Determination of the material content of an ethical claim is recognized as being circumstantial. Husserl's effort to maintain the formality of his approach while still accounting for circumstance leads him to the thought of Franz Brentano. Following Brentano, Husserl formulates a categorical imperative as Do the best that is (Tue das Beste unter dem Erreichbaren).2 This formulation of the imperative allows for multiple possibilities in any given situation which must be considered on the basis of what can actually be achieved in practical terms. For, if the best in any situation is not achievable, then how good can it practically be? The idea is to choose the best that is practically achievable, thereby improving the possibility for success in performing the willed action. A lesser achievement is better than a best failure. On this premise, the best that is attainable in any situation is the appropriate object of willing. Its implementation would be an ethical action. In this approach the good action depends upon a process of weighing alternatives to determine which has the highest value while being most feasible within the practical domain created by each situation. …