Abstract
Recent behavioral evidence suggests that mutation-susceptible, best-practice emulation is a common strategy updating mechanism among real world human actors. Unlike purely analytical models of non-cooperative strategic behavior, computational models employing mutation-susceptible emulation-based strategy updating mechanisms (e.g. elitist Genetic Algorithms) are susceptible to a process similar to genetic drift. This drift is known to disrupt the stability of an equilibria. This paper uses a computational, Genetic Algorithm based model to demonstrate that such equilibrium-disrupting drift resolves Selten's Chain Store Paradox. More broadly, this paper hopes to modestly demonstrate how results from behavioral game theory can fruitfully be used to select the mechanisms used in computational game theoretic models.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
