Abstract
The theory of language must predict the possible thought—signal (or meaning—sound or sign) pairings of a language. We argue for a Meaning First architecture of language where a thought structure is generated first. The thought structure is then realized using language to communicate the thought, to memorize it, or perhaps with another purpose. Our view contrasts with the T-model architecture of mainstream generative grammar, according to which distinct phrase-structural representations—Phonetic Form (PF) for articulation, Logical Form (LF) for interpretation—are generated within the grammar. At the same time, our view differs from early transformational grammar and generative semantics: We view the relationship between the thought structure and the corresponding signal as one of compression. We specify a formal sketch of compression as a choice between multiple possible pronounciations balancing the desire to transmit information against the effort of pronounciation. The Meaning First architecture allows a greater degree of independence between thought structures and the linguistic signal. We present three arguments favoring this type of independence. First we argue that scopal properties can be better explained if we only compare thought structures independent of the their realization as a sentence. Secondly, we argue that Meaning First architecture allows contentful late insertion, an idea that has been argued for in Distributed Morphology already, but as we argue is also motivated by the division of the logical and socio-emotive meaning content of language. Finally, we show that only the Meaning First architecture provides a satisfying account of the mixing of multiple languages by multilingual speakers, especially for cases of simultaneous articulation across two modalities in bimodal speakers. Our view of the structure of grammar leads to a reassessment of priorities in linguistic analyses: while current mainstream work is often focused on establishing one-to-one relationships between concepts and morphemes, our view makes it plausible that primitive concepts are frequently marked indirectly or unpronounced entirely. Our view therefore assigns great value to the understanding of logical primitives and of compression.
Highlights
Several species show evidence of the formation of complex mental representations for aspects of their social and physical environment as well as their planned actions (Bermúdez, 2007; Gallistel, 2011; Andrews and Beck, 2017; Chemla et al, 2019, and others)
We present existing evidence and argue that the Meaning First approach overcomes a conceptual problem that Late Insertion poses for Distributed Morphology
We argue that the Meaning First approach can provide an account of the division of semantic content between logical and socio-emotive meaning widely assumed in socio-linguistics (Eckert, 2018)
Summary
Several species show evidence of the formation of complex mental representations for aspects of their social and physical environment as well as their planned actions (Bermúdez, 2007; Gallistel, 2011; Andrews and Beck, 2017; Chemla et al, 2019, and others). Aspects of mental representations shared across species are expected to be present in humans too independently of language, even though humans unlike other species can relate complex linguistic signals to these representations. We argue that language involves a substantial compression of thought representations. This allows us to address evidence for silent structure in language. We show that the Meaning First approach makes correct predictions concerning the scope properties of sentences and might even compare favorably to other current views. We argue that late insertion within the Meaning First approach can predict key properties of the division of meaning into logical and socio-emotive aspects.
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