Abstract
A generalized Nash game is an n-person noncooperative game with nondisjoint strategy sets; other names for this game form include social equilibria and pseudo-Nash games. This paper explores both the qualitative and quantitative properties of such games through the use of quasi-variational inequality theory. Several interesting relationships between the variational and quasi-variational inequality forms of this class of games are described and the practical implementation of generalized Nash games are explored at length.
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