Abstract
The increasing scale of distributed energy resources connected to distribution networks can not only solve the operational problems in the distribution system, but it can also supply the transmission system with flexibility and ancillary services. Thus, the design of a market framework to suit this situation is required. This paper builds a generalized Nash game model with shared constraints for the joint day-ahead market where the centralized market coexists with the local market. In this model, the transmission system operator clears the centralized market assuming that resources of distribution systems are fixed, the distribution system operator clears the local market assuming that resources of the transmission system are fixed, and the clearing of the two markets are conducted simultaneously. Subsequently, the generalized Nash game model can be reformulated to a variational inequality problem that can be solved by the Goldstein–Levitin–Polyak projection method, and more than one generalized Nash equilibrium solution is obtained by the parametrized variational inequality approach. Finally, case studies on two systems, which consist of a 30-bus transmission system and 33-bus distribution system, and a practical 343-bus transmission system and 110-bus distribution system, respectively, are used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
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