Abstract
We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the -optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic and foreign firms.
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