Abstract
The ability to make inferences about related experiences is an important function of memory that allows individuals to build generalizable knowledge. In some cases, however, making inferences may lead to false memories when individuals misremember inferred information as having been observed. One factor that is known to increase the prevalence of false memories is the physical resemblance between new and old information. The extent to which physical resemblance has parallel effects on generalization and memory for the source of inferred associations is not known. To investigate the parallels between memory generalization and false memories, we conducted three experiments using an acquired equivalence paradigm and manipulated physical resemblance between items that made up related experiences. The three experiments showed increased generalization for higher levels of resemblance. Recognition and source memory judgments revealed that high rates of generalization were not always accompanied by high rates of false memories. Thus, physical resemblance across episodes may promote generalization with or without a trade-off in terms of impeding memory specificity.
Highlights
Memory integration—the ability to link information across related experiences—is an important function of memory
We manipulated the degree of overlap across related episodes in an acquired equivalence paradigm and tested the tendency to generalize across experiences and the ability to remember the source of generalized information
All three experiments showed increases in generalization for experiences with greater overlap but differed in whether errors in source memory accompanied increases in generalization. These results suggest a clear faciliatory effect of resemblance across episodes in the generalization that may sometimes, but not always, come with a loss of memory specificity
Summary
Memory integration—the ability to link information across related experiences—is an important function of memory. It allows individuals to build knowledge to support inferences and generalize prior experience to novel situations. After hearing that your friend from New York, Kyle, is spending his summer vacation at the Jersey Shore, you may generalize this preference to another friend from New York, Brad, assuming that he might make similar vacation plans. May come at the expense of memory specificity, as integration may lead to false memories (Carpenter and Schacter, 2017, 2018). You might falsely remember that both Kyle and Brad told you that they were going to the Jersey Shore when, you had merely inferred Brad’s plans. We were interested in the relationship between false
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