Abstract

Although theM1 -bargaining set for games with side payments is known to exist, it frequently contains payoffs which are highly inequitable. For this reason the more restrictedM2-bargaining set is of interest. SinceM2 is not known to exist in general, this paper introduces anM*-bargaining set, contained inM1 and containingM2, and presents an existence theorem. For the class of symmetric, simple games with decreasing returns, theM2 -bargaining set is shown to exist, and a fairly severe restriction on payoffs satisfyingM2 -stability is obtained.

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