Abstract
Founded on bounded rationality and limited information, evolutionary game theory has been preliminarily applied in many fields, such as electricity market (EM). To address the complex behavioral decision-making issues in the more-common three-population multi-strategy evolutionary game (3PmSEG) scenarios in EM. This paper explores the long-term evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) characteristics of general 3PmSEG systems with the aim of systematically investigating the evolution process of long-term on-grid bidding of a generation-side EM based on these features. First, the long-term ESE characteristics of general three-population two-strategy and three-strategy evolutionary games are thoroughly investigated. Complete relative net payoff (RNP) parameters are defined for these games. Then, the modeling idea of general 3PmSEGs is elaborated. Research shows that the game can be guided to evolve toward an expected long-term ESE point by properly adjusting its RNP parameters. To verify this, finally, the long-term on-grid bidding of power generation is investigated for a tripartite generation-side EM. The case study reveals that effective government supervision can effectively promote new energy accommodation of the market. Overall, the models developed in this paper are relatively universal and practical, which can provide some theoretical and methodological references for complex evolutionary game issues in related fields.
Highlights
When addressing complex multi-agent behavioral decisionmaking issues, game theory is gradually becoming a useful and powerful mathematical tool to overcome such obstacles [1], [2]
This methodology system adopts the natural selection mechanism and does not require strict assumptions of rationality, which is closer to reality and better reflects the spontaneous evolution of strategies of different interest groups during the dynamic process
To address the complex behavioral decision-making issues in the more-common 3PmSEG scenarios in electricity market (EM), this paper focuses on a class of symmetric and asymmetric 3PmSEG models with the aim of systematically investigating the evolution process of long-term on-grid bidding of a generation-side EM based on the models’ long-term evolution characteristics
Summary
When addressing complex multi-agent behavioral decisionmaking issues, game theory is gradually becoming a useful and powerful mathematical tool to overcome such obstacles [1], [2]. EGT is an important and powerful mathematical tool to investigate the characteristics of long-term gaming behavior of multiple groups This methodology system adopts the natural selection mechanism and does not require strict assumptions of rationality (i.e., it is founded based on bounded rationality and limited information communication), which is closer to reality and better reflects the spontaneous evolution of strategies of different interest groups during the dynamic process. Ii) During the investigation, this paper thoroughly and systematically defines relative net payoff (RNP) parameters for all general 3PmSEG systems investigated in this paper Based on these RNP parameters, all the game scenarios including complete behavioral decision-making characteristics (i.e., all the evolution states of the system during evolution) are analyzed, summarized and simulated for various evolutionary game models. Eq (3) shows that the differential of the probability (or ratio) of individuals selecting a strategy in population is proportional to this probability value, as well as the difference between the expected payoff of this strategy and the average expected payoff of the population at this time [41]
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