GENERAL DETERRENCE AND TELEVISION CABLE CRIME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL CONTROL*

Abstract

This research examines the deterrent effect of a written legal threat on a group of persons who are known to be receiving an unauthorized premium cable television signal. The experiment attempts to determine (1) the overall violation rate: (2) the extent to which violators direr from a systematic random sample of cable signal customers (according to age, total household income, and gender); and (3) the deterrent effect of the threat of intervention. Additionally, a six‐month follow‐up was conducted to assess the duration of the threat's effect.Overall, two thirds of the subjects (n=67) reacted to the threat; the major reaction to the threat was an attempt to hide the violation. There were some differences found regarding participation in cable crime and deterrence, but none reached a reliable level of statistical significance. Regarding deterrence, the findings that males heeded the threat least and that the youngest and richest also showed low desistance rates after exposure to the threat are consistent with previous research. Regarding participation in cable crime, the youngest and richest seem to be involved more often in the pilfering of signals. The follow‐up revealed that the deterrent effect of the intervention lasted at least six months. The benefits of using experimentation as a general deterrence research strategy are emphasized throughout.