Abstract

How Darwinian evolution would produce creatures with the proclivity of Darwinian generosity, most of them voluntarily giving up the immediate benefit for themselves or their genes, remains a puzzle. This study targets a problem, the origin of human sense of fairness, and uses fairness-related genes and the social manipulation of Darwinian generosity as the key variables underlying the human sense of fairness, inequity aversion, as well as their relationships within cooperation, and the anticipation foresight of the way relationships are affected by resource division, given the assumption of randomly matched partners. Here we suggest a model in which phenotype will gradually converge towards the perfect sense of fairness along with the prospect of cooperation. Later, the sense of fairness will decrease but it is never extinct. Where social manipulation of Darwinian generosity overshadows genetics, the sense of fairness could be acute to the degree of social manipulation. Above all, there still exists a threshold in the degree of social manipulation, beyond which altruism dominates selfishness in human cooperation. Finally, we propose three new directions toward more realistic scenarios stimulated by recent development of the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.

Highlights

  • Lastly but most importantly, pairwise social interactions have dominated the interpretation of many biological data, though far from reality, above all in the public goods game with many players

  • In a society following Nash’s axioms in the division of the total sum, the phenotype will converge towards pure altruism, while IA1 will converge towards the low end when the prospect of cooperation is increasing over time

  • The origin of human sense of fairness, and suggest a model in which phenotype will gradually converge towards the perfect sense of fairness along with the prospect of cooperation

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Summary

Introduction

Lastly but most importantly, pairwise social interactions have dominated the interpretation of many biological data, though far from reality, above all in the public goods game with many players. The public goods game with many players would probably be well interpreted in terms of group interactions for their inherent irreducibility[43]. This perspective has been applied to study the emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions, in which individuals engage in an iterated N-person prisoner’s dilemma[44]. The current framework can be extended to examine gene-culture coevolution wherein migration in combination with within-group selection against altruists is a much stronger force than selection between groups It will probably stimulate the interest of another scientific community

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