Gender, Strategies, and Contributions to Public Goods

Abstract

This study examines factors affecting cooperation in public goods settings involving relatively small groups. In particular, the gender composition of the group and the history of the group's level of cooperation are investigated. Three game-theoretical predictions are posited. Using expectation states theory and social identity theory, I offer two different sets of hypotheses regarding gender identity. A 3x2 experimental design tests the predictions; the factors are gender composition of the groups and others' behavior. All game theory predictions are supported. Further, for the public goods setting examined, expectation states theories provide more accurate models of group members' behavior than social identity theories. The preservation of rain forests and endangered species, creation and maintenance of community public school systems, and creation of community watch programs are examples of the social dilemmas that surround us. In the short run, it is costly to donate time, money, and effort for the preservation or creation, but the dilemma associated with this short-run, myopic interest is that it conflicts with the long-run interest of both the individual and the group. Thus, if all follow short-run interests, the rain forests are not preserved and the community watch programs fail. Fortunately, however, social dilemmas sometimes are convincingly solved. In this