Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

The European Court of Human Rights has recently proclaimed gender equality as one of the key underlying principles of the Convention. However, the Court's jurisprudence has been largely impotent in challenging gender discrimination in the member states. This article explores the reasons why this is so by analysing Article 14 sex discrimination jurisprudence and the application of the principle of gender equality in the ‘Islamic headscarf’ cases. The author argues that reasons lie in the Court's formalistic conceptualization of discrimination, and simplistic and paternalistic understanding of gender equality, which is insensitive to intersectionality of discrimination. The author proposes an understanding of gender equality as challenging (multiple and intersectional) forms of disadvantage. Under this approach, the question in equality jurisprudence would not be whether there was unjustified differential treatment, but rather whether the law or practice at issue perpetuated or produced subordination of women (as defined by other identity characteristics) and unequal gender (and other) relations.