Gender diversity in compensation committees and CEO pay: evidence from China

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to address whether gender diversity on compensation committees ensures objective determination of CEOs’ compensation.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use a sample of companies listed in China from 2006 to 2015. The authors use pooled ordinary least square regression as the baseline methodology, and two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching to control for endogeneity.FindingsThe authors find evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees limit CEOs’ total cash compensation and strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance, but only independent female directors have a significant impact, indicating that the monitoring effect outweighs the executive effect. Moreover, compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors have more impact on CEOs’ total pay and the link between CEO pay and firm performance than do committees with a single female director. Finally, gender-diverse compensation committees are more effective in setting CEOs’ compensation in state-controlled firms, where agency issues are more severe.Practical implicationsFemale directors can improve firm-level governance by monitoring management actions, such as setting CEOs’ compensation. The study contributes to the debate on gender diversity in the boardroom, finding a positive economic effect. The study sheds light on China’s diversity practices at the director level and provides empirical guidance to China’s regulatory bodies.Originality/valueThe authors extend earlier studies by providing the first empirical evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance; that independent female directors are more effective in the monitoring role than executive female directors; that compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors are more effective in setting CEOs’ pay than are committees with a single female director; and that the influence of gender-diverse compensation committees on CEOs’ pay varies by type of ownership.