Abstract
In this paper I discuss whether Godel's incompleteness theorems have any implications for studies in Artificial Life (AL). Since Godel's incompleteness theorems have been used to argue against certain mechanistic theories of the mind, it seems natural to attempt to apply the theorems to certain strong mechanistic arguments postulated by some AL theorists. We find that an argument using the incompleteness theorems can not be constructed that will block the hard AL claim, specifically in the field of robotics. However, we will see that the beginnings of an argument casting doubt on our ability to create living systems entirely resident in a computer environment might be suggested by looking at the incompleteness theorems from the point of view of Godel's belief in mathematical realism.
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