Gaze patterns and brain activations in humans and marmosets in the Frith-Happé theory-of-mind animation task.

Abstract

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. This ability extends even to the attribution of mental states to animations featuring simple geometric shapes, such as the Frith-Happé animations in which two triangles move either purposelessly (Random condition), exhibit purely physical movement (Goal-directed condition), or move as if one triangle is reacting to the other triangle's mental states (ToM condition). While this capacity in humans has been thoroughly established, research on nonhuman primates has yielded inconsistent results. This study explored how marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), a highly social primate species, process Frith-Happé animations by examining gaze patterns and brain activations of marmosets and humans as they observed these animations. We revealed that both marmosets and humans exhibited longer fixations on one of the triangles in ToM animations, compared to other conditions. However, we did not observe the same pattern of longer overall fixation duration on the ToM animations in marmosets as identified in humans. Furthermore, our findings reveal that both species activated extensive and comparable brain networks when viewing ToM versus Random animations, suggesting that marmosets differentiate between these scenarios similarly to humans. While marmosets did not mimic human overall fixation patterns, their gaze behavior and neural activations indicate a distinction between ToM and non-ToM scenarios. This study expands our understanding of nonhuman primate cognitive abilities, shedding light on potential similarities and differences in ToM processing between marmosets and humans.