Gaza 2014: Israel's Attrition vs Hamas' Exhaustion

Abstract

ABSTRACT: While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israel's civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas' military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies inter acted with each other, assesses the strategic gains and losses on each side, and suggests some lessons relevant for American strategists. ********** Operation is the Israel Defense Forces' name for its latest military operation against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza during the months of July-August 2014. This article analyzes the competing strategies of Israel and Hamas in this specific bout of fighting and assesses how effective they were in achieving their political ends. By strategy we mean how each side attempted to optimize its physical and psychological use of violence in achieving its political goals. Strategy is the art of deciding what violent acts would best assist in bringing about one's political goal, and then executing them. In some cases, the actions chosen might be synonymous with the political goals (for example, when the political goal is conquest of territory) but often they are only a means of hurting the rival sufficiently so he agrees to acquiesce to the political demand. Israel's military strikes on Gaza and Hamas were much more destructive in terms of loss of life and property than those of Hamas on Israel. However the efficacy of military action is measured not by how much carnage and destruction it wreaks on the enemy, but by the achievement of political goals and the cost in terms of resources expended and destruction suffered in return. The similarity in military actions notwithstanding, the specific political context of Operation was very different from Cast Lead 2008 and Defensive Pillar 2012. By 2014, Hamas had suffered a severe financial crisis that threatened its ability to rule Gaza. As a result, we believe Hamas used force to cause the main actors --Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and others--to release their strangle-hold on Hamas' revenues. This desperation drove Hamas to endure a much higher level of physical damage before agreeing to a ceasefire. Israel failed to read this situation correctly, which led to surprise over Hamas' determination to fight. In the first section, we analyze the wider context and the rivals' political goals on the eve of hostilities. In the second section, we describe how each developed its strategy to match its political goals and how the two strategies interacted with each other and were modified according to developments on the ground. In the final section, we assess the gains and losses of each side and discuss potential lessons for America and its allies. The Wider Context: Political Goals Prior to Operations Hamas' Political Goal: Staying in Power The recent bout of fighting between Israel and Gaza is just the latest escalation against the backdrop of almost constant fighting between Jews and Arabs since 1920. Although Operation Protective Edge has an official start-date, 8 July 2014, and an an official end-date, 26 August 2014, it would be inaccurate to portray it as isolated conflict. In fact, even with regard to the short-term processes that led to the Israeli decision to initiate another operation the aforementioned start and end dates are mere formalities. The fighting did not begin then, and is unlikely to end for any appreciable period of time. Israel's decision to initiate Operation Protective Edge was a response to Hamas' escalation of rocket and mortar fire--an escalation that began gradually from 13 June. Hamas' ultimate goal, as declared in its charter, is to destroy the state of Israel and establish a Palestinian Arab state based on the Shariya --the laws of Islam. (1) However, Hamas leaders are fully aware attaining this goal is not feasible for now, and they must first achieve domination of the Palestinian nation as a whole. …