Gately values of cooperative games

Abstract

AbstractWe investigate Gately’s solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately’s conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified “propensity to disrupt” the negotiation process of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs. We show that Gately’s solution concept is well-defined for a broad class of games and that it can be interpreted as a compromise solution. We also consider a generalisation based on a parameter-based quantification of the propensity to disrupt. We provide an axiomatic characterisation of the original Gately value as well as these generalised Gately values. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship of these Gately values with the Core and the Nucleolus and show that Gately’s solution is in the Core for all regular 3-player games, but is fundamentally different from the Nucleolus. We identify exact conditions under which these Gately values are Core imputations for arbitrary regular cooperative games. Finally, we investigate the relationship of the Gately value with the Shapley value.