Abstract
ObjectiveTo estimate the effects on homicide rates of the gang truce that was brokered in El Salvador in 2012.MethodsMathematical models based on municipal-level census, crime and gang-intelligence data were used to estimate the effect of the truce on homicide rates. One model estimated the overall effect after accounting for the linear trend and seasonality in the homicide rate. In a moderated-effect model, we investigated the relationship between the truce effect and the numbers of MS13 (Mara Salvatrucha 13) and Eighteenth-Street gang members imprisoned per 100 000 population. We then ran each of these two models with additional control variables. We compared values before the truce – 1 January 2010 to 29 February 2012 – with those after the truce – 1 March 2012 to 31 December 2013.FindingsThe overall-effect models with and without additional control variables indicated a homicide rate after the truce that was significantly lower than the value before the truce, giving rate ratios of 0.55 (95% confidence interval, CI: 0.49–0.63) and 0.61 (95% CI: 0.54–0.69), respectively. For any given municipality, the effectiveness of the truce appeared to increase as the number of MS13 gang members imprisoned per 100 000 population increased. We did not observe the same significant relationship for imprisoned Eighteenth-Street gang members.ConclusionIn the 22 months following the establishment of a national gang truce, the homicide rate was about 40% lower than in the preceding 26 months. The truce’s impact appeared particularly strong in municipalities with relatively high numbers of imprisoned MS13 gang members per 100 000 population.
Highlights
In 2012, there were 16.3 homicides per 100 000 population in the Americas as a whole and 26.5 per 100 000 in Central America.[1]
We report the results of the first large-scale quasi-experimental study of a government-facilitated gang truce that was designed to reduce the number of homicides
Analysis showed no significant difference between the homicide data provided by the police and that collected by the Institute of Legal Medicine
Summary
In 2012, there were 16.3 homicides per 100 000 population in the Americas as a whole and 26.5 per 100 000 in Central America.[1]. Policy-makers have relied on the police to respond to violent gang conflicts that result in homicides. Gang members are unlikely to contact the police to resolve a conflict when doing so would result in loss of status and possible exposure of illegal activities to the police.[5] Second, the residents of neighbourhoods with gang problems are often reluctant to call the police for fear of gang reprisal[6] and often have a poor perception of the police.[7] Third, the police typically operate by responding reactively to specific incidents rather than proactively to the ongoing problem of disputes between gangs.[8]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
