Abstract
Bilateral contract transaction among generation companies and large consumers is attracting much attention in the electricity market. A large consumer can purchase energy from generation companies directly under a bilateral contract, which can guarantee the economic interests of both sides. However, in pursuit of more profit, the competitions in the transaction exist not only between the company side and the consumer side, but also among generation companies. In order to maximize its profit, each company needs to optimize bidding price to attract large consumers. In this paper, a master–slave game is proposed to describe the competitions among generation companies and large consumers. Furthermore, a Bayesian game approach is formulated to describe the competitions among generation companies considering the incomplete information. In the model, the goal of each company is to determine the optimal bidding price with Bayesian game; and based on the bidding price provided by companies and the predicted spot price, large consumers decide their personnel purchase strategy to minimize their cost. Simulation results show that each participant in the transaction can benefit from the proposed game.
Highlights
With the development of the smart grid and the deep reform of electricity market, the market is becoming more and more active
The practice of direct power purchase transaction by large consumers demonstrates that the electricity market is transforming from a single generation side market to a bilateral market [1]
This paper focuses on the bilateral contract transaction with multiple generation companies and large consumers
Summary
With the development of the smart grid and the deep reform of electricity market, the market is becoming more and more active. The work of [16,17] proposed a two-level game model to optimize purchasing and selling strategies of power retailers in the spot market and bilateral contract market. Authors in [20] proposed a master–slave game model to optimize bidding price for multiple generation companies and purchase strategy for large consumers. The research on the electricity market with incomplete information is mainly about the bidding strategies of generating companies [21,22,23,24], while few studies focus on the bilateral contract transaction considering the situation of incomplete information. Based on the above analysis, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) according to the transaction process among generation companies and large consumers, a master–slave game model is proposed, in which a Bayesian game is applied.
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