Abstract
This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.
Highlights
Environmental consciousness has become increasingly important in everyday life and business practice [1]
E remainder of this paper is organized as follows: necessary notations and assumptions are given in Section 2; Section 3 conducts the decentralized decision model involving a Bertrand game and a Stackelberg game, aiming to discuss the theoretical and practical meanings of the model and acquire optimal solutions for all the participants; in Section 4, a centralized supply chain model is presented; a numerical illustration is shown in Section 5 to make some supplements; Section 6 summarizes the whole paper and shows the future research prospects
In order to visualize the models, we present an example with the following scenario: given market potential demand a 1000, consumers’ purchasing preference proportions for the physical store retailer and the e-commerce retailer are λ 0.6 and 1 − λ 0.4, the marginal demand with respect to the sales price is δ 3, the demand shift with respect to the price is θ 2, the marginal demand with respect to the green degree level is β 1, and the fixed cost related to the green degree is φ 2
Summary
Environmental consciousness has become increasingly important in everyday life and business practice [1]. The manufacturer and the two retailers jointly determine the green degree and sales prices In this scenario, we pay no attention to the wholesale price because it does not make any impact on optimal decision. E remainder of this paper is organized as follows: necessary notations and assumptions are given in Section 2; Section 3 conducts the decentralized decision model involving a Bertrand game and a Stackelberg game, aiming to discuss the theoretical and practical meanings of the model and acquire optimal solutions for all the participants; in Section 4, a centralized supply chain model is presented; a numerical illustration is shown in Section 5 to make some supplements; Section 6 summarizes the whole paper and shows the future research prospects. We assume that the stock-holding cost is a constant so that it does not affect the decision of each participant
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