Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users

Abstract

We consider the problem of Internet switching, where traffic is generated by selfish users. We study a packetized (TCP-like) traffic model, which is more accurate than the widely used fluid model. We assume that routers have First-In-First-Out (FIFO) buffers of bounded capacity managed by the drop-tail policy. The utility of each user depends on its goodput and the congestion level. Since selfish users try to maximize their own utility disregarding the system objectives, we study Nash equilibria that correspond to a steady state of the system. We quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from such selfish behavior. We show that for a single bottleneck buffer, the price of anarchy is proportional to the number of users. Then we propose a simple modification of the Random Early Detection (RED) drop policy, which reduces the price of anarchy to a constant. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium can be reached if all users deploy TCP Vegas as their transport protocol under the drop-tail policy. We also consider some natural extensions of our model including the case of multiple Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, routing on parallel links and general networks with multiple bottlenecks.