Game theory based complex analysis for nuclear security using non-zero sum algorithm

Abstract

The non-linear complex algorithm is applied to the nuclear security where the non-zero sum quantifications of the game theory is applied for simulations. In the results, the values are described as the integers, because the Boolean values are calculated in the modeling. There are several interested factors as Nuclear Fuel, Safety System, Security System, Operator, and Government. In the simulations, the positive values show the possibility of terror incidents which are obtained as dynamical manner in the Boolean numbers of 1.0 or −1.0. The cumulative values show the five nuclear security factors are summed up. For the aging effect, the graph gives the highest value as 18 at 715th month. The analysis of payoff graph shows the result of the payoff of each factor where there are meeting points around 360th month and 450th month. Therefore, the possibility of the terrorism increases as time goes on.