Abstract
The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.
Highlights
Ecological civilization refers to the sum of material and spiritual achievements made by human beings following the objective law of harmonious development of human, nature, and society [1,2]
The behavioral dissimilation of local governments in the process of the third-party soil pollution control under fiscal decentralization are analyzed, including whether local governments choose the third-party soil pollution control and whether local governments conspire with third-party enterprises in third-party control
When the central government implements the policy of third-party soil pollution control, local governments adopt the strategy of execution or nonexecution
Summary
Ecological civilization refers to the sum of material and spiritual achievements made by human beings following the objective law of harmonious development of human, nature, and society [1,2]. Environmental pollution has become an important factor that restricts the realization of ecological civilization and sustainable development. Whether in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implemented by the United Nations [3], or in the construction of ecological civilization implemented by China [4], environmental pollution control has been given more attention around the world [5,6]. Based on environmental resource elements, environmental pollution can be divided into air, water, and soil pollution. Among these pollutions, soil pollution has the characteristics of concealment, hysteresis, accumulation, nonuniformity, and irreversibility, so the process of soil pollution control is arduous [7]. With the rapid economic growth, China has faced with the situation of widespread environmental pollution [8], and soil pollution is relatively
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