Abstract
The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a process of evolution along with the equilibrium point of the game theory. It is also an institutional change involving China’s primary economic system and rural basic management system. This paper used the stakeholder theory to determine the main stakeholders in the RCPRSR and then analyzed the behavior mechanism of the main stakeholders through the method of game theory. The results indicate that the main stakeholders are farmers, village organizations, and government. The Nash equilibrium solution is executing and joining respectively village organizations and farmers. Game theory also suggests that the RCPRSR is a gradual and repetitive dynamic process, not the result of one-time rational design. Based on the conclusions of the research, it indicates that should raise the enthusiasm of the village organization. This can increase the income of farmers and flourish the rural economy of China.
Highlights
The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a rural system reform that takes villages as units and distributes the rights and interests of the collective assets in the form of shares to the members of the collective who meet certain standards
The main stakeholders refer to individuals, groups, or/and institutions that directly intervene in the RCPRSR
This paper mainly studies the dynamic game among participants of different forms of RCPRSR under the condition of sufficient information
Summary
The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a rural system reform that takes villages (groups or towns) as units and distributes the rights and interests of the collective assets (operational assets, resource assets and public welfare assets) in the form of shares to the members of the collective who meet certain standards. RCPRSR is a process of evolution along with the equilibrium point of the game theory It is an institutional change involving China’s primary economic system and rural basic management system. The RCPRSR is a complex and repeated dynamic game theory process caused by the differences between the expectations and actual returns of multiple participants. This process refers to a lot of stakeholders (Note 3). The foundation of the RCPRSR is to protect the rights and interests of farmers and to reasonably divide the property rights of collective assets among the state, village organization, and member (Xingqing, 2016). ‘conclusions and recommendations’ concludes the Nash equilibrium for the RCPRSR and suggests the steps for further study
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