Game theoretic spectrum allocation for competing wireless access technologies to maximize the social welfare

Abstract

Due to its scarce nature, the limited frequency spectrum must be effectively allocated to competing wireless access technologies. A promising approach is to consider frequency spectrum as a commodity and model the spectrum allocation as a market dynamics problem. Using this approach, we have addressed the competition for frequency spectrum by e.g. 3G and 4G technologies where network operators, users and the regulatory agent are the market players. We have modeled the system dynamics as a novel three-stage game creating a unified framework for spectrum allocation, network best response and user welfare. By finding the Nash equilibrium of the game, the influence of regulatory decisions and impact of network/user strategies is analyzed. Through the interaction of networks and users and influence exerted by the regulatory, the resulting spectrum allocations are proved to be Pareto efficient with maximal social welfare. The devised model and following results provides a much needed and important framework for the regulatory and network operators for adjusting spectrum allocation table towards maximizing the social welfare for all the players.