Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a repeated trust/honor Kreps (1990) game that explains how knowledge-based contractors and firms in an industrial cluster arrive at a high effort and high pay equilibrium. From my literature review findings, I analyze the role that knowledge-based contractors have in creating and disseminating knowledge in industrial clusters to form basic assumptions for the game theoretic model that I apply. Keywords Industrial Clusters, Knowledge-Based Contractors, Kreps Model, Contracts, Reputation, Repeated Contract Game.
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