Abstract

Due to an ever-increasing market penetration of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), the charging demand is expected to become a main determinant of the load in future distribution systems. In this paper, we investigate the problem of controlling in-home charging of PHEVs to accomplish peak load shifting while maximizing the revenue of the distribution service provider (DSP) and PHEV owners. A leader-follower game model is proposed to characterize the preference and revenue expectation of PHEV owners and DSP, respectively. The follower (PHEV owner) decides when to start charging based on the pricing schedule provided by the leader (DSP). The DSP can incentivize the charging of PHEV owners to avoid system peak load. The costs associated with power distribution, line loss, and voltage regulation are incorporated in the game model via power flow analysis. Based on a linear approximation of the power flow equations, the solution of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is obtained. A case study is performed based on the IEEE 13-bus test feeder and realistic PHEV charging statistics, and the results demonstrate that our proposed PHEV charging control scheme can significantly improve the power quality in distribution systems by reducing the peak load and voltage fluctuations.

Highlights

  • Following the increasing ownership of private plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), in-home charging is expected to become one of the common activities of electricity customers in the near future

  • We investigate the problem of controlling in-home charging of PHEVs to accomplish peak load shifting while maximizing the revenue of the distribution service provider (DSP) and PHEV owners

  • A case study is performed based on the IEEE 13-bus test feeder and realistic PHEV charging statistics, and the results demonstrate that our proposed PHEV charging control scheme can significantly improve the power quality in distribution systems by reducing the peak load and voltage fluctuations

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Summary

Introduction

Following the increasing ownership of private plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), in-home charging is expected to become one of the common activities of electricity customers in the near future. One is to schedule the electricity demand by signing a contract between utility company and customers [2] This approach can be implemented, its flexibility and options are limited to be popularized in the future. Since the base load and charging demand are timevarying over a day, the distribution service provider (DSP) can adjust the electricity rate in different periods such that PHEV owners are willing to shift their charging time to off-peak hours for a lower price. In [4], a game theoretic approach is proposed to optimize the schedule of electric vehicle charging in a parking lot with a highly dynamic electricity price during the day time. Each PHEV owner plays the role of follower, who chooses the start

AIMS Energy
System Model
Formulation of the Non-cooperative Dynamic Game
Game formulation
Utility function of PHEV owner
Utility of charging
Utility of waiting
Utility function of DSP
Charging power
Line loss
Voltage regulation
Solution of Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Case Study
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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