Abstract

A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.

Highlights

  • In Taiwan, there are two ways for anyone to be a candidate: to be nominated by a party or to run for a position independently

  • The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first

  • There were some famous examples of violating the party rule to elect independently in the electoral history of Taiwan

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Summary

Introduction

In Taiwan, there are two ways for anyone to be a candidate: to be nominated by a party or to run for a position independently. A member in the party without nomination should renounce membership to run for a position. There were some famous examples of violating the party rule to elect independently in the electoral history of Taiwan. There may be some benefit for a member to renounce membership to run for a position. This paper sets up a game model to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership to run for a position. We concern with the behaviors of the candidate without nomination and the decision maker of the other party. We first consider the case of the candidate without nomination moving first. We use sequential equilibrium to describe the equilibrium in the case where the information is imperfect

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