Game Theoretic Analysis of Cooperative Message Forwarding in Opportunistic Mobile Networks

Abstract

In cooperative communication, a set of players forming a coalition ensures communal behavior among themselves by helping one another in message forwarding. Opportunistic mobile networks (OMNs) require multihop communications for transferring messages from the source to the destination nodes. However, noncooperative nodes only forward their own messages to others, and drop others' messages upon receiving them. So, the message delivery overhead increases in OMN. For minimizing the overhead and maximizing the delivery rate, we propose two coalition-based cooperative schemes: 1) simple coalition formation (SCF) and 2) overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game. In SCF, we consider the presence of a central information center, whereas OCF is a fully distributed scheme. In SCF, coalitions are disjoint, whereas in OCF, a node may be the member of multiple coalitions at the same time. All nodes in a coalition help each other cooperatively by forwarding group messages to the intermediate or destination nodes. The goal of the nodes is to achieve high success rate in delivering messages. The proposed SCF scheme is cohesive, in which disjoint coalitions always combine to form grand coalition. In OCF, a node reaches a stable grand coalition when all the nodes of the OMN are members of overlapping coalition of the node. No node gains by deviating from the grand coalition in SCF and OCF. Simulation results based on synthetic mobility model and real-life traces show that the message delivery ratio of OMNs increase by up to 67%, as compared to the noncooperative scenario. Moreover, the message overhead ratio using the proposed coalition-based schemes reduces by up to about (1/3)rd of that of the noncooperative communication scheme.