Abstract
The property right of small water conservancy projects (hereinafter referred to as SWCP) currently can be defined as three different forms: public property rights, private property rights, and a combination of public and private property rights. The main participants are the government, farmers, and other organizations. The interests and demands of different subjects are different, so the property rights structure of the SWCPs are also different. In order to explore the evolutionary law of the property right structure of SWCPs in the case of conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders, a game model for the evolutionary law of each main body of SWCPs was proposed in this paper. By analyzing the feasibility of the game of multi-stakeholder appeal conflicts, a multi-stakeholder game model was established. The game and evolution of each stakeholder were analyzed, and the evolution of the property rights of SWCPs under the game of each subject was simulated and analyzed. The research results show that if the incentives and constraints of cooperation between farmers and cooperatives, associations and other organizations are greater than the cost of cooperation, farmers will participate in the cooperation and invest in elements actively, thus promoting the integration of elements, thereby contributing resource complementarity among participants and leaving more cooperation surplus. If the benefits of cooperation between the government and farmer organizations plus the total benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are greater than the total cost of active cooperation, furthermore, the incremental benefits of the incentive and restraint mechanism are not lower than the incremental costs of participating in the cooperative, then, farmer organizations are easier to get succeed. The research results have certain reference significance for the option of the property rights and management modes of SWCPs.
Highlights
Water conservancy projects are important infrastructures that guarantee national economic development, social harmony and public safety
Since there are multiple subjects with different demands involved in SWCPs, this paper focuses on the study of the evolutionary game of property rights of SWCPs under the conflicts of appeals of multistakeholders
In order to explore the evolution process of the property right structure of small water conservancy projects under the condition of conflicting demands of multiple stakeholders, this paper started with the game model of each stakeholder in the SWCPs, and used the evolutionary game theory model to simulate and analyze the game behavior of each body
Summary
Water conservancy projects are important infrastructures that guarantee national economic development, social harmony and public safety. With the characteristics of a small scale and scattered distribution in the fields, small water conservancy projects are usually regarded as a typical public pond resource [12]. The maintenance and operation of SWCPs are more difficult, while the two aspects are directly related to the efficiency of agricultural income and water use, and they are crucial to food security and the development of rural economy. Different property rights arrangements determine different organizational structures, incentive and restraint mechanisms, thereby affecting the efficiency of resource allocation. The structure of SWCP property rights is unreasonable. A simulation analysis is conducted to provide a basis for determining the property right structure of SWCPs
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