Game relations between platform enterprises and participants of digital interaction-sharing platforms in the maritime logistics industry

Abstract

Digital platforms simplify the complexities of day-to-day transactions in the maritime logistics industry and facilitate participants to seamlessly connect with each other. However, platform enterprises find it difficult to involve participants in their platforms. It is also challenging for these enterprises to share data out of consideration for participants’ privacy concerns, rights, and interests. To promote data sharing, this study intends to understand the strategies of both platform enterprises and participants based on a dynamic game model to provide policy implications to platform enterprises and the government. The main findings are as follows. First, when platform enterprises move first, they should subsidize key participants with high privacy costs to compensate for the negative externality of data. Second, in the early stages of building a platform, when supporting platform enterprises move first, they must subsidize both key participants with low privacy costs and general participants. Third, governments must introduce regulations and laws to govern the delimitation of data property rights.