Game Plan and Definitions

Abstract

Abstract This book will focus on subjective experience, also known as phenomenal consciousness. But this may also relate to other notions of consciousness such as wakefulness and volitional control (contra automaticity). An important distinction has been made between subjective experience and informational access. However, just because two concepts are distinct does not mean that they are empirically unrelated. We must resist defining subjective experience as decidedly independent from cognition from the outset; this is in part an empirical question. Current theories on subjective experience fall into two broad camps: global and local views. These two theoretical extremes differ on five main issues: Does consciousness critically depend on activity in the prefrontal and parietal cortices? Is subjective experience sparse rather than rich? Is consciousness important for higher cognitive functions? Is consciousness somewhat limited in young children and primitive animals? Is machine consciousness ever possible? Global theories say yes to these five questions. Local theories say no to all of them.