Game Models for Closed-Supply Chain with Different Competition-Cooperation Relationships under Fairness Preference

Zhang Nian,Wei Kun,Li Bin,Wang Mengxue

doi:10.1155/2020/6793216

Zhang Nian, Wei Kun + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/6793216

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Abstract

Considering the complex problem of competition and cooperation among enterprises in the process of product selling and recycling, different coopetition game models of closed-loop supply chain with the fairness preference of a manufacturer and retailers are constructed according to the actual investigation. Then, this study primarily used fairness preference theory and game theory to analyze the impact of fairness preference on the pricing decision, recycling and remanufacturing strategy, and coopetition model selection. The results show that (1) enterprises’ fairness preference would increase the wholesale price and retail price, and the stronger the degree of fairness preference is, the more obvious the trend is; (2) enterprises’ fairness preference is not conducive to recycling and remanufacturing, and the higher level of fairness preference is associated with the lower recycling rate of waste products; (3) enterprises’ fairness preference would not affect the model selection but would benefit the overall profit.

Highlights

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) focuses on taking back products from customers and recovering added value by reusing the entire product and/or certain of its modules, components, and parts
Does the cooperative company pay attention to its own profit, and it considers whether it is fair to other members’ profit in the supply chain. erefore, how does fairness preference affect the coopetition game of a closed-loop supply chain? How does fairness preference affect the coopetition relationships among companies and the optimal decision-making in CLSC? ese have become new problems in theoretical research and practical management
En, in order to provide support for establishing a “win-win relationship,” the optimal decision-making of different coopetition games with fairness preference has been studied

Summary

Introduction

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) focuses on taking back products from customers and recovering added value by reusing the entire product and/or certain of its modules, components, and parts. Zheng et al analyzed the optimal decision-making problem of CLSC members under the fair neutral and fairness preference of retailers and found that the fairness preference of leading retailer was beneficial to the maximization of their own utilities and unfavorable to maximize the profits of the manufacturer and third parties [12]. Is paper takes the CLSC as a research object, considers the impact of fairness preference on different horizontal and vertical competition and cooperation among CLSC nodes, and builds a dynamic coopetition game model. En, in order to provide support for establishing a “win-win relationship,” the optimal decision-making of different coopetition games with fairness preference has been studied. The optimal retail price, wholesale price, recycling rate, and supply chain profit under different horizontal and vertical coopetition game in the CLSC are presented. The impact of fairness preference is analyzed on prices, recycling rate, and profits in the CLSC by an numerical simulation

Problem Description and Assumptions

CLSC under Fairness Preference

Numerical Simulation