Abstract
In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.
Highlights
Introduction e Global Coal MarketReport (2018–2023), jointly organized by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the National Energy Group, points out that coal is still the core of the global energy system and global coal demand will remain stable in the ve years. e Coal Market Report 2017, jointly issued by the China O ce of the Sustainable Cities and Communities (SUC) Project and the International Energy Agency (IEA), points out that ensuring the economic bene ts and ensuring the safety of coal industry are recent policy priorities
In order to reduce the occurrence of coal-mine safety accidents, improve the current situation of coal-mine safety production, and ensure the sustainable development of coal mining industry, domestic and foreign scholars have studied effective countermeasures to promote coal-mine safety production from different perspectives and aspects
E first research stream of coal-mine safety production enhancement focuses on the human factors such as controlling the unsafe behavior of miners. e unsafe behavior of miners is the most direct cause of coal-mine safety accidents and the main reason for destroying the normal operation of coal-mine safety production [4,5,6]. e miners always face a trade-off between work stress for safe operation and psychological benefits for unsafe operation, and reaching higher psychological and spiritual benefits might have strong substitution effects with safe operation
Summary
Management, the organization is responsible for protecting coal enterprises’ production situation by the incentive strategy. If the miners choose unsafe operation, it will save the cost and gain physical and mental benefits but may increase the accident probability and result in an expected punishment loss later on During this process, t4 represents the physical and mental profits, t5 represents the safety performance of unsafe operation, c4 represents the unsafe operation cost, c5 represents the fine when the unsafe behavior of miner are supervised and reported by the manager, and c6 represents the bribe cost of miner paying to the manager. If the managers choose dereliction of supervision duty and even power rent seeking, they will gain rents from miners and undertake expected loss later at the same time During this rent-seeking process, s2 represents the “bribe” profits, s4 represents the safety performance of rent seeking, s4 < s3, and c7 represents the rent-seeking cost. The population dynamic of the evolutionary game in the coal mining safety production can be represented by the following replicated dynamic equation set:. According to the replication dynamic equations of the organization, miners, and managers, the eight equilibrium points of the dynamic games are E1 (0, 0, 0), E2 (0, 0, 1), E3
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