GAME MODEL FOR ONLINE AND OFFLINE RETAILERS UNDER BUY-ONLINE AND PICK-UP-IN-STORE MODE WITH DELIVERY COST AND RANDOM DEMAND

Abstract

Online retailers are increasingly adding buy-online and pick-up-in-store (BOPS) modes to order fulfilment. In this paper, we study a system of BOPS by developing a stochastic Nash equilibrium model with incentive compatibility constraints, where the online retailer seeks optimal online sale prices and an optimal delivery schedule in an order cycle, and the offline retailer pursues a maximal rate of sharing the profit owing to the consignment from the online retailer. By an expectation method and optimality conditions, the equilibrium model is first transformed into a system of constrained nonlinear equations. Then, by a case study and sensitivity analysis, the model is validated and the following practical insights are revealed. (I) Our method can reliably provide an equilibrium strategy for the online and offline retailers under BOPS mode, including the optimal online selling price, the optimal delivery schedule, the optimal inventory and the optimal allocation of profits. (II) Different model parameters, such as operational cost, price sensitivity coefficient, cross-sale factor, opportunity loss ratio and loss ratio of unsold goods, generate distinct impacts on the equilibrium solution and the profits of the BOPS system. (III) Optimization of the delivery schedule can generate greater consumer surplus, and makes the offline retailer share less sale profit from the online retailer, even if the total profit of the BOPS system becomes higher. (IV) Inventory subsidy is an indispensable factor to improve the applicability of the game model in BOPS mode.