Abstract

Running multiple virtual networks is a promising way to support diverse applications over a shared substrate. Despite being simple, a static division of bandwidth between virtual networks can be highly inefficient, while dynamic bandwidth allocation performs much better, but that is difficult to guarantee the stability. Based on the idea of the Stackelberg solution from noncooperative game theory, this paper presents a game theoretic model for dynamic bandwidth allocation between virtual networks, which can be stable and can maximize the revenue of both infrastructure providers who manage the physical infrastructure and service providers who utilize the virtual networks to provide services. In the model, the substrate network as a leader designs a pricing mechanism for bandwidth that attempts to drive the virtual networks to the social optimal solution, each virtual network as a follower chooses a willingness-to-pay to maximize its own profit. We prove that the model admits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium point and the bandwidth allocation between virtual networks is efficient and fair.

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